Adds a reporting requirement with respect to good-faith emergency disclosures to the government by electronic communications service providers and makes technical fixes to the law to clarify congressional intent.
Imposes several additional safeguards on the use of multipoint electronic surveillance under FISA. Specifically it: requires additional specificity from an applicant before “roving” surveillance that follows a target from cell phone to cell phone may be authorized; clarifies that a judge granting surveillance must ensure in the order that the surveillance is authorized only for the target in the application; requires increased specificity for applications for surveillance where a description of the target, rather than the target’s actual identity, is provided to the court, so that each application describes a single, unique target; requires investigators to inform the court within 10 days when “roving” surveillance authority is used to target a new facility—such as when a terrorist or spy changes to a different cell phone; requires investigators to inform the court on an ongoing basis of the total number of places or facilities under surveillance pursuant to a “roving” surveillance order; and requires additional reporting to Congress.
Requires additional reporting to Congress on the use of FISA authorities and the FISA court to develop and publish rules of procedure.
Adds several additional protections on the use of delayed-notice search warrants. Specifically it: requires a court to set a deadline for the initial period of delay, one that presumptively must be within 30 days of the search; requires the applicant to provide the court with an updated showing of necessity before the delay period may be extended; provides that any extension should be a period of 90 days or less except in exceptional circumstances; and requires public reporting on the use of delayed notice search warrants.
Adds significant new safeguards to each of the National Security Letter statutes. The report: clarifies that a recipient may disclose receipt to an attorney or others necessary for compliance; provides explicitly for a judicial challenge to an NSL; provides that a nondisclosure order does not automatically attach to an NSL; provides explicit judicial review of a nondisclosure requirement accompanying an NSL; requires the Justice Department official to re-certify that nondisclosure is necessary, or else to let the nondisclosure provision lapse, if a nondisclosure requirement is challenged more than a year after the NSL issues; provides that only certifications by a few Senate-confirmed officials, made at the time a petition is filed, are entitled to a heightened degree of deference; adopts the Senate passed (by unanimous consent) standard of review for non-disclosure; for the first time, requires public reporting on the use of NSL authorities; requires additional reporting to Congress on the use of NSL authorities; and requires the Inspector General to conduct an audit of the Justice Department’s use of NSLs.
Requires a report to Congress on any use of data-mining programs by the Department of Justice.
On December 19, President Bush vowed to continue authorizing non-court ordered eavesdropping on Americans thought to have ties to terrorism. “As president of the United States and commander in chief I have the constitutional responsibility and the constitutional authority to protect our country,” he said in a year-end press conference.
